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Colin Crouch recently chided the proliferation of institutionalisms (e.g., historical, 
normative, ideational, discursive, constructivist)  as a growing cottage industry more 
focused on creating intellectual fiefdoms than extending political theory. In this vein, we 
can assess the recent ―constructivist institutionalism‖ developed by Colin Hay out of the 
ideational and discursive institutionalism efforts of himself, Mark Blyth,Vivian Schmidt, 
J.L. Campbell and Ove Pedersen. This constructivism reproduces all of the weaknesses of 
the sociology of knowledge without heeding  the contributions of critical theory, 
poststructuralism, interpretivism (e.g., Mark Bevir), polycontexturality (e.g., Gunther 
Teubner) or recent economic theory. We are challenged to represent a polycontextural 
sense of complementarity: as a framework within which seemingly incommensurable and 
colliding discourses can be regulated if not reconciled (e.g., Robert Boyer). Beyond the 
constructivists‘ focus on policy-makers‘ application of ideas, there is a need to test the 
warranted assertions and truth claims inherent within the practices of an institutional 
regime or legacy, along with the institutionalizing trajectory. This is an unfolding of 
categorical analysis whose immanent predicate logic within a context of situated agency 
provides the basis for critique. A more critically oriented  institutionalism journeys into 
the interior of institutions beyond ―interestedness‖ toward ―commitedness,‖ toward the 
endogenous emergence of the argumentative logic of a mode of legitimation.There is a 
need to align institutionalist analysis with  a theory of legitimation grounded in actors‘ 
valuation of what is right.  
  
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALIST TURN:  
NORMATIVE UNFOLDING BEYOND THE INTEREST GROUP APPROACH 
  
Institutional space is understood as never being closed; and as always open for 
argumentation, the novelty and creativity of actors. Institutions need  to be understood in 
terms of their  institutionalizing discourse. In particular we will focus on (1) what David 
Kettler refers to as bargaining regimes;  
and (2) what Frank Nullmeier, Mark Bevir and Chris Ansell refer to as argumentation 
networks. We approach institutions as stabilizing structures. Yet we also imagine and 
enact claims as institutionalizable practices. We are, as Louis Althusser cogently put it, 
bearers of supports. But we are also bearers of claims. These are claims that we trade on, 
and claims by which we argue about fairness, procedure, and sometimes justice. More 
specifically, as Jurgen Habermas would counter Althusser, we are bearers of institutional 
regimens and their normative claims, i.e., legitimations.  Institutional regimens can be 
analyzed with a focus on the promise of signifiers.  Whether those signifiers have 
delivered or not on their promise of order/ ordering. We are bearers of subject positions. 
 We are bearers of subject positions in an ensemble of interpretive schema which are 
themselves responsive to structural, positions. These are subject positions along a 
constellation  immanently connected to the ideational constructs of a regime model. 
Institutions position subjects ideationally, prefiguring and conditioning how we as 
subjects practice and creatively adapt and transform forms of life.  
  
Political science has since the 1980s been marked by an institutionalist turn .Such a turn 
is in part a questioning of a paradigmatic shift to the hegemonic NeoLiberal 
regime/model. The New Institutionalism extends a tradition blazed in the United States 
by John R. Commons (1862-1945) and Wesley C. Mitchell (1874-1948), who studied 
collective action controlled individual action, how transaction logic within an associated 
negotiation psychology had overcome the hedonistic exchange logic of self-interested 
psychology; and how the collective bargaining contract had surpassed the individual 
prerogative contract. NeoLiberalism is a movement to actualize a utopia – the regime 
model of turn of the twentieth century neoclassical economics with its emphasis on 
markets. The NeoLiberal utopia imposes the logic of transaction costs in contracting,  
rather than creating constellations of trust. Market relations are imposed in spheres where 
classical and neo-classical economics would not go –the caring professions, universities, 
prisons.  
  
The New Institutionalism (March and Olsen, DiMaggio and Powell, Granovetter and 
Majone) helps surmount  any sense of individual vulnerability with the experience of 
associative relationships and attachments. There is a focus on  (1)―accounts‖ and 
―procedures‖ involved in interpretations;  as well as (2)  the logics of appropriateness‖ ; 
and (3) the ―branching points‖ associated with both path-dependent and path-shaping 
relationships. In particular, the Historical Institutionalism (HI) of Peter Hall, Ira 
Katznelson and Gary Herrigel is attentive to the practices and procedures in which 
collective action is articulated. It also reveals both the legacies and capacities of emergent 
forms of institutionalizing practice. Here it picks up on the political sociology of Arthur 
Bentley and David Truman with its paradoxical concept of ―potential groups‖/ potential 
interest and how they came to be articulated into political conduct.  
  
Regimes (regimens) are purposefully created normative frameworks organizing an 
institutional setting within which bargaining and negotiations can take place, and both 
bonding and binding force can be assumed. A regime offers a template of normative 
understandings, a mental model for re-envisioning practices. For institutionalists like 
Peter Hall (1989, 1993), it is unremarkable that policy-makers in a Keynesian treasury 
will confine themselves to policy proposals consistent with Keynesian orthodoxy, even 
when a more utility-maximizing option might be present. What is of distinct interest to 
HI  is the 
branching points where the Keynesian parameters of public choice  no longer seem 
capable of offering policy solutions. 
  
Regimes are purposefully created normative frameworks organizing negotiations among 
a formally specified set of actors - - an institutional setting within which negotiations can 
take place, and both bonding and blind force can be assured.   
  
A regime offers 
                        ·        a template of normative understandings 
·        a specific mode of legal discourse corresponding to the logic of  
argumentative practices for fair negotiations based on discourse 
specific norm 
                        ·        a model of institutional justice; and 
                        ·        a utopian model for re-visioning practices.   
  
A regime is an ensemble of constitutive discourse providing the imaginary framework 
through which we interpret the symbolic order into which we are drawn, if not thrown.  It 
is a carrier of institutionalizing practices and governance rationales.  And, as an internal 
ensemble of discourse generating both legitimation and truth claims, it is open to 
interpellation/interrogation.   
  
The interest group approach was effectively challenged at the dawn of the 1970s by the 
social movement literature of Alain Touraine and Cornelius Castoriadis - - specifically on 
the very process of interest group formation and the creation of new norms and values.  
Institutions are understood as playing a mediating role as mechanisms for regulating 
conflict - - ―mechanisms for arriving at decisions, the application of which is sanctioned 
by legitimate authority.‖ (Touraine,1977:  178-79).  This implies that there are operative 
norms prior to politics, learned legitimations - - that ―all claims are not negotiable‖.  
Touraine (1977: 196) anticipates historical institutionalism by denoting how social action 
is circumscribed by a defined and particular historical context - - one that orients the field 
of social relations as well as the stakes in every kind of conflict or negotiation. 
  
The nature of path dependency is heavily influenced by the operative norms set by 
politically active members of the society - - i.e., an elite.  But Touraine and Castoriadis 
pointed to the differing and contradictory role expectations at work in any instituted 
configuration - - and that these differences and contradictions do not simply originate in 
the operative norms themselves.  Discursive traces of alternative institutionalizing 
practices are always at work.  And these, Touraine notes 1977:  (362,311) ―overflow the 
frame in which they appear‖ and ―mobilize demands which cannot be entirely satisfied‖ 
within the interior arc of subject positions within a preconfigured regime and its frame of 
practical reasoning and learning. 
  
Beyond Isaac Balbus‘s notion of latent groups and class determinism (1971), there is 
another approaching and veering off from Truman. This is now less in terms of class 
determinism or epochal/regime periodization - - as in the Regulation Theory approach 
(Robert Boyer, Michel Aglietta, Alan Lipietz) - - and possibly more in terms of a 
transformative discursive modality detectable within the normative categorials of a 
predicate logic.  Beyond David Truman‘s discussion of potential groups, we can focus on 
potential norms, emergent institutions. 
  
Beyond the 1970s turning to latent groups, social movements and structured inequality 
came respectively an institutionalist and a discursive turn, as political sociology focused 
more and more on normative commitment.  As Douglas North noted (1990) institutions 
were increasingly seen as the missing element in comprehending the normative 
framework of cooperative and competitive relationships.  
  
 For the ―new institutionalism‖of  DiMaggio and Powell (1991 :11), institutions were 
seen as establishing the very criteria by which people discover their preferences.  
Institutions were increasingly seen as constitutive of preference-formation, and not just as 
strategic environments within which actors pursue exogenously-given interests.  Much of 
the new institutionalism was to become preoccupied with a cognitive bedrock of shared 
normative constructions - - templates and constructionism became the hegemonic 
buzzwords.  For a summary of the new institutionalisms, see Figure 1 below. 
  
The turn toward normative commitment and normative regulation served to counteract 
the emphasis on interest aggregation; and - - as Joseph Heath in Communicative Action 
and Rational Choice (2001: 309) notes - - ―to counteract the general tendency of human 
affairs to go very badly when left to self-interest.‖  Legitimation was understood in the 
communications theory of Habermas as the ―warranted assertions of substantive 
rationality‖ eschewed by Weber‘s rationalization theory. These warranted assertions were 
bracketed by Mannheim in Ideology and Utopia not as ideational constructions 
constitutive of knowledge, but as superstructural illusions materially produced and 
periodized.  Critical here is the constructionist reprise of the Sociology of Knowledge 
approach of Berger and Luckmann as well as of Mannheim.   
Habermas‘ ongoing project pushed us to recognize how we are socialized to develop a 
higher disposition in our practical reasoning, one that enables us to assign normative 
reasons priority over the institutional ones.  One that enables us to appreciate how we can 
distill underlying norms from the institutional context, from their experience as practices.  
And in doing so, how to boil off the normative predicate logic of a substantive 
rationality.   
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We are unbracketing legitimation forms that Berger and Luckmann as well as Mannheim 
treat sociologically without considering their ontological and epistemological claims.  
Legitimations,  represent the substance by which our preferences are ordered.  And 
Habermas‘s legitimation theory involves taking up ―warranted assertions‖ with their 
―sense of appropriateness‖ and attendant constitutive ―application discourse‖ - - all of 
which are ultimately testable in the ―transcendent discourse‖ of 
universalizability/generalizability.  (See Klaus Gunther, 1988).  
  
 BUILDING ON HABERMAS’S THEORY OF LEGITIMATION / 
                TOWARD A CRITICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
 Habermas‘ legitimation theory breaks as well with rational choice institutionalism 
(RCI) and its preference-hierarchy, transaction cost minimizing behavior and utility 
calculations - - which Hall and Soskice (2000) might yield too much ground to.  RCI 
starts with preferences that are exogenous to a model where all factors are held constant.  
Nothing is prior to individual utility calculi.  And institutions are understood as merely 
vehicles for respective utility maximizations.  RCI cannot account for the social, only 
what is at base intentional - - only what is  strategic pursuant to exogenously given 
interests.  Again, we return to the counterpoint - - the discursive approach to the 
substantive rationale of legitimating conduct, and its engagement of the instrumental 
rationale of strategy and preference.  Crucial is the former‘s focus on an internalist 
conception of legitimation (Peters, 1996) The constellation of positions within a 
legitimating argument is internal to the argument itself.  It is an endogenous constellation 
of positions that a subject discursively takes in order to redeem normative commitments 
boiled-off in unbracketed form from their institutional husks. 
  
The commitments - - i.e., justifications in discoursive theoretical terms - - make claims 
upon acting subjects.  They exist independently of the acting subjects.  Not just as a 
legacy or an institutional supply of justification, but as a trajectory with semblances and 
traces along an arc of subject positions.  This internalist trajectory is itself a contingent 
byproduct of accumulating social conflict and cooperation.  The trajectory and its arc - - 
which characterize the endogenous constellation of subject positions within normative 
argument - - moves us to an evaluation of possible normative alternatives. 
  
Thinking in terms of constellations, trajectories and arcs enable us to see how 
legitimating claims and strategies exist independently of actors and are drawn upon by 
actors.  As Andrew Sayer (2000) reminds us, ―(T)he political discourse exists as it is 
regardless of whether I study it and whatever I think of it.‖  The dynamic of the 
constellation of discourse is something acting subjects internally (endogenously) 
participate in and constitute as they go along.  The constellation is constituted as we 
interrogate it.  Our contingent articulation involves less a functional playing of roles, and 
more of an authorial interpreting and infusing of roles with our instituting imaginary. 
 The constellation comprises a predicate logic - - with warrant predicates and truth 
predicates; with assertoric claims and validity claims; and with application discourse and 
generalizability discourse.  (See Heath, 2001, and Klaus Gunther, 1988).  Beyond 
Truman, the nature of our on-going willingness to ―play by the rules‖ is subject to 
positioned criteria of warranted assertability.  These criteria, claims of rightness and their 
propositional content are reflexively reconstructable - - rationally reconstructable - - as 
Habermas labels this internal constellation of normative commitment and attendant 
argument.  They are rationally reconstructable as unfolding normativity.   
  
This is not just a bounded rationality of recombinatory elements, but an imaginative 
projecting of a growing rationality.  This is an imaginative projecting and reconstructing 
that enables us to recognize the new - - that is, the ―novel‖ - - within an institutional 
trajectory.  It is also an explaining of (1) either institutional stability; or (2) how ideas 
about institutional change or transformation fit into a hermeneutical circle of 
argumentation and interpretation - - an endogenous source of change within a 
constellation of discourse.  They do not merely fit within pre-existing institutions - - their 
tree-like roots, and their capillary growth of outcome paths.  Ideas provide the point of 
mediation between actors and their environment.  The subject actors‘ point of access to 
their densely structured context is irreducibly ideational - - and discursive.  
  
Within a given specific context, there is an unevenly distributed configuration of 
opportunity and constraint for subject actors.  And along with it a structural “strategic 
selectivity,” that is, only certain specific paths of strategic action are available, and only 
some of these are likely to be actualized in actors‘ intentionality.  As in RCI, only some 
actors ―read‖ the paths effectively - - but this is so as a result of there not being the 
perfect information assumption ―all things being equal‖ in much neoclassical economics 
and rational choice theory.  Actors without complete information need to interpret the 
world on the basis of a constellation of ideas in order to orient themselves strategically, to 
reflexively monitor both the context and consequences of their actions.  Thus there is as 
well a “discursive selectivity” derived not from material structure, but from the claims 
and frames yielded in an interrogation of the constellations of interpretation and 
argumentation that function as cognitive filters, embedded and growing within 
institutions - - that function as the language of a text, a narrative about structured material 
inequality, latent groups as well as normative commitment.  The claims and frames are 
yielded in the strategies which subject actors devise as a means to:  (1) realize their 
intentions upon a material context which favors (―selects‖) certain strategies; and (2) 
accommodate their normative commitments in so doing.  This is not idealism, but an 
ideational accessing with both the material and normative context.  This is not the 
longings of desire or the imposition of cognition; rather, it is an engaging of the 
discursive with the material environment, not a dissolving. 
  
This is a relating of a theory of institutions to a theory of normative unfolding.  This is as 
a substantive theory and not merely a proceduralist formalism, not as an essentialist 
mythic/mystic narrative of some inherent national ordering.  Two decades of sympathetic 
critics - - such as  Klaus Hartmann, Ota Weinberger and Ottfried Hoffe -  - have urged 
Habermas to grasp the need for a theory of institutions which he could ground his 
discourse theory in - - as a theory of Institutional Normativism (IN). 
  
What historical institutional (HI) finds in the institutional trajectory of unfolding 
normativity and its arc of subject positions is not idealism but discursive selectivity - - 
one which remains in dialectical tension with the exogenous structural selectivity of 
material incentive and opportunity structures.  This results in a constant dialogic tension 
confronting the discursive theoretical terms of an HI modified by communications theory 
into a theory of legitimation we will call Critical Institutionalism (CI).  This is a dialogic 
tension with the strategic opportunism inherent in RCI and evolutionary institutional 
economics.  Habermas helps HI with its persistent troubles with ideas, the constellation 
of legitimating, and normative commitment.  On the other hand, HI poses a final ―way 
out:‖ to Habermas‘s persistent and unnecessarily confining problem of equating strategy 
with ultimately utility-based technique and purely instrumental reasoning; and second to 
his separating the realm of normativity and law from institutional facts.   
  
HI has been open to acknowledging exposure ideas, but tends not to see ideas as 
normative contents within institutional practices.  Conceptualizing HI as a legitimation 
theory enables us to conceive of the ordering of preferences less structurally, and more 
endogenously within a constellation of discourse/argument--where institutional 
commitments ―ghost the future‖ in traces and semblances of the unborn, or not yet 
actualized. 
  
Institutions contain within them a normative core--a chain of practical reasoning/a 
constellation of action-related argumentation.  Jurgen Habermas offers HI procedural 
normative models by which the cognitive (i.e., validity) claims within such 
argumentation can be made meaningful--in terms of the legitimation they immanently 
project.  Neil MacCormick and Ota Weinberger (1986) sympathetically modify 
Habermas.  They refer to their modification as Institutional Normativism (IN), ideas are 
not to be bracketed, but are to be subject to reflexive reconstruction as a form of 
discourse (practical reasoning) so that normative potentialities made available by 
collective learning processes are scanned for realizability. 
  
In contrast to either the “brute facticity” of empiricism or the counterfactual chimera of 
procedural normativisism, (IN) focuses on normative contents within institutional or 
institutionalizing practices, “institutional facticity”--i.e., the nature of our participation in 
the promising game and obligation game inherent in legitimation.  Ideational structures 
that are the byproduct of the rearticulation of bargaining power within conflict become 
institutionalized and normalized as ―facts,‖ and their warranted assertions as ―immanent 
forms.‖ IN is rationally reconstructive of the institutionalizing “warranted assertions” 
involved in our participation within emergent forms of life. 
  
―Critical Theory redeems past hope in the name of the future by revealing the as yet 
unrealized potentials of the present.‖  It asks to what extent sedimented and floating 
signifiers have not yet delivered on their promise of a substantive order.  Unlike the 
Sociology of Knowledge of Karl Mannheim or Berger and Luckmann, critical theory 
does not deny the immanent development and affirmation of changed and new forms - - 
changed and new conceptual mediations of social reality - -- as a process of knowledge 
driven by an inner dialectic, as an unfolding of categorial analysis whose immanent 
predicate logic provides the basis for critique. 
  
Critical Theory is a theory of legitimation as rational aspiration.  It uncovers and 
measures its utopian content - - the substance of the organizing principles embedded 
within its worldview (Weltanschaung), its mental model.  Critical Theory tests the 
warranted assertions and truth claims of legitimations inherent within an institutional 
legacy, an institutional trajectory, and the arc of an institution‘s anticipated horizon (or 
constellation).  It is a form of self-reflective knowledge in itself.    
  
A theory of legitimation is grounded in actors‘ valuation of what is right.  And the more 
ideational institutionalism we have posed reflects the tradition of institutionalism as 
institutional embodiment of normative substance, rather than the tradition of evolutionary 
institutional economics.  It is legitimated intersubjectivity as a substance with its own 
internal principles - - its own entelechies.  (See Massimo LaTorre, 1999). Historical 
institutionalism (HI) conceptualized as a theory of legitimation can account for this 
ideational foundation of institutions.  Part of the gap in HI results from the fact that 
practicing political sociologists - - often by training - - are skeptical or dismissive of the 
possibility of any rational grounding for unfolding normativity. 
  
A substantive understanding of institutionalism is one that fills gaps, aporias (in both 
Derrida‘s and Benhabib‘s terms), and situations of undecidability with semblances 
(Adorno), iterable traces or spectral presences (Derrida).  And a Critical Institutionalism 
(CI) resulting from the grounding of Habermas‘s brand of critical theory as discourse 
theory in a theory of institutional facts resists the gapless normativism of a Kelsen or a 
Langdell, it as well resists the equally positivist imprinting of the black letter law without 
recourse to Natural Law.  And for that matter, it will also resist  Habermas‘s surrogate for 
Natural Law--a proceduralist transcendental formalism known as the Theory of 
Communicative Competence with its test in the court of the Ideal Speech Situation.    
  
The CI developed here evaluates the forms by which societies evaluate themselves, that 
is, the formal ordering of what Ottfried Hoffe (1987) has referred to as ―Institutional 
Justice.‖  Hoffe understands a juridico-discursive--like Bo Rothstein--order in the 
“discourse theoretical terms” of argumentative forms, rather than in an engagement 
with chimerical counterfactuals.  These argumentative forms serve as the vehicles by 
which we extend the institutionalizing dialogue of deliberative justification into the 
marketplace and civil law as governmentality - - governance rationales used in 
practices, rather than idealizations (chimera).  This involves discourses answering 
practical questions--and with it a discursive selectivity testing for the dialogic claims of 
an unredeemed predicate logic, beyond the functional sociological compliance and 
justification of a strategic selectivity. 
  
Critical institutionalism as a capstone to historical institutionalism (HI) can be 
understood as an internalist principled game, a language game 
·        wherein norms rather than some mythic/mystic substance is experienced as 
inner institutional morality (Hermann Heller), 
·        wherein deliberation defines its own guiding norms and practices as an 
institutionalizing governance rationale (Jurgen Habermas), 
·        wherein norms are not understood as objects of pure cognition, but as 
values we commit ourselves to in our practices:  (Georges Gurvitch); and 
·        wherein norms emerge as the socially shared solutions to problems and as 
byproducts of repeated social conflicts - - from which they are transformed  
into a constellation of learned normative commitments, revealed as promises.  
  
Here the ―institutional‖ represents the non-contractual dimension of obligation - - the 
shared standards of self-governance, and valuation, the normative commitments and 
promises of a ―promising game constituted in and through discourse theoretical terms. 
  
Critical institutionalism  --- like the “critical history” posed by Michel Foucault and 
Mitchell Dean (1999) --- goes beyond posing critical junctures of contingent emergence. 
 It involves a capacity to engage in interrogation of the internalist principled/promising 
game - - wherein discourse is ontologically prior to identity-formation, and legitimacy is 
prior to legality.  ―No individual can choose to stand outside the totality of the 
interpretive frameworks of discourse written into our very human condition.‖  
Institutional Justice involves the legitimated ordering of regimes  - - substantively and 
procedurally - - in terms of formal models of law and political economy. 
  
Subject positions - - themselves constituted discursively - - are an ensemble of 
interpretative schema responsive to structural positions.  They are drawn upon as 
legitimating strategies and mark how we experience our structural position within the 
social.  ( Here see the development of this concept from Gramsci through Althusser 
through Laclau and Mouffe.)  Thus we are not just bearers of supports, but actors who 
draw upon a repertoire of discourse resources - - within a discursive structure of signifiers 
- - interpretive schema, rights, claims and collective identities tied to subject positions.  
We are actors who draw on legitimations of purposive and substantive argumentation. 
  
Subject position within respective regimes of law and political economy can be rationally 
reconstructed in discourse.  In doing so the internal relations of an immanent normative 
unfolding or a projected re-institutionalizing of practices can be gauged - - in the 
discourse theoretical terms of argumentative forms, i.e., discursive selectivity.  Subject 
positions are more in a condition of floating signifiers that have not yet delivered on its 
promises, on its normative commitments, on its reflected visions.  And moving along the 
interior arc of a regime‟s subject positions, we move beyond the configurative paths, 
junctures and practices of “effective history” practiced by HI, toward a “critical 
history” associated with CI.  The latter employs more of a diremptive approach - - a key 
phrase from Habermas and ironically Georges Sorel before him.  The diremptive 
approach attempts to reflect reality at more than one moment, one instance. Diremptions, 
following Georges Sorel, are more the fluid representations of cinema rather than 
snapshots. 
  
Legitimations are positioned in narratives and worldviews/world picture - - not as static 
snapshots, but as panning shots of a regime in motion - - with social movement, swelling 
beyond thresholds, and institutional emergence.  A diremptive approach scans a 
constellation of instances that open up to montage-like presentation 
  
 ·        where genres return to haunt us not just as memory, but also as    
possibility of uncanny actualization; and 
 ·        wherein the future is never either fully determinable or fathomable but only    
grasped and recognized as traces or semblances - - moved by the necessity of truth, rather 
than the arbitrariness of ideology - -within the gaps among the intermittent rhythms, 
sequences and jump cuts  
  
Critical institutionalism (CI) complements historical institutionalism by keeping us aware 
that the swelling of historical movement and change is an instance of displacement, as 
much as it is path-dependent.  This is the displacement of one threshold for another.  
History, Walter Benjamin advised us, is never wrapped into a specific moment of a fixed 
juncture.  Rather, it flows in a passage that swells beyond the limits of its epoch, of its 
period.  It confronts a gap - - or aporia - - and makes up for it by constituting a canal for 
the displacement of the swelling (schwelle), a superimposition of a threshold. (See 
Eiland, 2001) 
  
 CRITICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND THE ARGUMENTATIVE TURN /  
THE INTERIOR OF INSTITUTIONALIZING TRAJECTORIES & THEIR ARCS 
  
As Adorno notes, the democratic imaginary seeks traces of a prospect of utopia within a 
society that continually betrays it, tracing its own claims which ghost the future. The 
trace of a tradition of discourse associated with an emergent practice and juridification 
draws on the categorical framing of a democratic imaginary in its historical struggles and 
in its immanent potential.  The practices and forms of the traditions of labor law and 
social law can be grasped categorically as assertional commitments  (, 1994) Robert 
Brandom), and not counterfactually as chimera (G.A. Kelly (1969).  Chimera are anti-
historical.  The issue of immanent historical warrants - - rather than visions of order - - 
are immanent within the core of practices, immanent within a regime of discourse whose 
claims are interrogated/interpellated.  This immanence is inherent in what George 
Hendrik von Wright (1971) would call a quasi-teleology of normic statements - - that is, 
legitimating, propositional claims.  A Critical Institutionalism (CI) goes beyond the 
Sociology of Knowledge in unbracketing normative commitments from practices, from 
their institutional husks. 
  
Categorial form is created in historical time but attains independent validity as the 
argument behind an institutionalizing practice is interpellated and gauged.  Beyond the 
Sociology of Knowledge, Institutional Normativism (IN) starts with a genealogical study 
of the evolution of institutional practices as reworkable traces of affirmative substance, 
the substance of an emergent form of legitimation.  Then IN is transformed into CI in its 
interpellation of the legitimating argument itself, which guides the ―imaginary institution 
of society.‖ 
  
Beyond HI, and its focus on path dependency, Critical Theory as CI and ―critical 
history‖ understands a process of self-clarification and emergent possibility internal to a 
historical process, internal to the argument of normative principles that are the core of 
institutional/institutionalizing subjects.  Following the anthropologist Mary Douglas in 
How Institutions Think (1986), institutions can be conceptualized as subjects of action, as 
bearer of practices and their normative claims/commitments.  A Critical Institutionalism 
looks beyond the ―discursive selectivity‖ of some logic of appropriateness and the 
interestedness of actors‘ application of that logic, what Schattschneider once called the 
―mobilization of bias.‖  CI looks beyond ―interestedness‖ toward ―commitedness.‖  In 
this way CI may have more in common with Philip Selznick‘s ―old institutionalism‖ with 
its focus on the affirmativity of institutional commitments as an ontology of institutional 
facts, rather than the focus of RCI on ―contracting.‖ 
  
Beyond interestedness and discursive selectivity, we are moved to focus on discursive 
commitment itself rather than merely the application of the commitment.  We are 
moved to a theory of legitimation rather than of interest groups, to a commitedness to 
rights and procedures. 
  
Rational Reconstruction can be understood externally/explicitly as the process tracing of 
the contingent interaction, the discursive selectivity of policy-makers‘ performance and 
claims within a path dependent institutional context. 
  
Rational Reconstruction can also be understood as a more internalist/implicit 
interpellation of the commitments themselves:  their warrants, their propositions, the 
arguments immanent within path shaping/institutionalizing practice ―boiled off from their 
institutional husks.‖ (Peters, 1996 / Note here Frank Fischer and John Forester, eds. 
2005:  The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning.) 
  
  
Figure 2 below, describes the dialectical relationship between the explicit performative 
practices and norms and the more depth-level implicit values and warranted assertions.  
Rational reconstruction is more than retrieval--it is the reconstruction of a set of practices 
we have come to learn, and the underlying values by which legitimation claims are 
evaluated. 
  
Social Subjects of Rights of the democratic imaginary are inscribed in material practice - 
- not as a system of ideas in people‟s heads, but as material practices existing in people‟s 
conduct according to their commitments.  These material practices can be understood not 
only in terms of an ordinary causal emergence reducible to micro-properties, and path 
dependency within predetermined paths of appropriateness.  These practices can also be 
conceptualized in terms of a novel path-shaping and holistic emergency wherein a set of 
properties (such as the governance of labor law and social law) may be determined by 
and dependent on other properties, but not reducible to those others.(McClure, 1996a, 
1996b).  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
FIGURE 2 
  
2A.      The EXPLICIT/External  (realm of contingency) 
  
·        empirico – sociological level of practical reasoning 
·        assertion as action/conduct 
·        performative derived from interestedness 
·        action – related argumentation 
  
o       regimes of argumentative practices having “discursive 
selectivity” 
o       the arguments of policy makers 
o       the coherence of a policy program as carried out by elite actors 
  
·        External Rational Reconstruction 
                           as a process-tracing of the contingent interaction within a path 
                           dependent institutional context 
  
  
 
 
____________________ mediated by an internal dialectic ____________________ 
        
      
   
 
  
      
  
  
  
2B.       The IMPLICIT/internal  (realm of necessity) 
  
·        Grammatological, juridico-discursive order with “internal relations” 
·        Assertion as normativity 
  
·        Epistemological claim/warranted assertion derived from 
committedness (“self-referring”) 
  
o       the argument itself: commitments as normative core 
o       interpellation of propositions 
o       resonance with value form categorials 
o       immanent with legitimation arguments 
  
·        Rational Reconstruction of the Internal Relations of the immanent and 
emergent normativity ―boiled off from its institutional husk‖ as an “arc of 
subject positions” within an immanent rationale. 
  
  
  
Following Campbell and Pedersen, CI can be seen as a strand of discursive 
institutionalism (DI).  By DI, Campbell and Pedersen denote what we called IN, 
institutional normativism (IN).  DI focuses on perceptions and meanings in ―discourse 
theoretical terms,‖ (dtt’s) but not in terms of apriori categorials of legitimation that 
precede cultural perceptions and legal meanings.  DI’s principal concern is to trace the 
process by which an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations are translated into 
institutional patterns--how we are discursively structured, and the ways in which policy 
debate is conducted. 
  
Kjaer (2004) understands DI as the relationship between discourse and institution as the 
outcome of historically specified ways of situating and organizing practices in a society 
with horizons of meaning.  Hay (2001) defines a strand of DI as the “ideational 
institutionalist approach‖ (II) as a process-tracing of the way people position one another 
through the use of a widely employed discourse; as a sociology of practical knowledge 
detailing the application of dominant ideas/legitimations by policy-makers.    
  
DI involves ―normic statements.‖  This is the level of theory ―which leaves open the 
question whether people are doing what people invariably do in those uniquely 
complicated circumstances or are doing one of the comparatively few things which 
people…choose to do in such circumstances.‖ 
  
The II strand of DI/IN focuses on performatives of learning and problem-solving--
practical judgments wherein intuitions, understandings, commitments and pragmatic 
actions align and combine.  In so doing, II details a regime of propositionally 
differentiated speech acts, emerging out of institutional facticity.  And it identifies the 
compelling reasons for what we say or do in concrete situations. 
  
Beyond policy-makers‘ application of ideas, CI is the strand of DI/IN that turns to the 
ideas themselves, and to the argumentative logic of a legitimation.  It also turns to the 
experience of that argumentative logic.  This is what is referred to in policy analysis as 
“the argumentative turn.”  This ―argumentative turn‖ opens up the commitments implicit 
in the decision-making of governance, and captures the endogenous emergence of 
argumentative logic that breaks with hegemonic patterns of legitimizing thinking 
associated with a regime. 
  
Argumentative propositions are defined which problematize hegemonic normative 
statements--which counter justifying assertions of regime leaders.  Thus, CI can elucidate 
ideas and actions which are not readily predicted by the rational reconstruction of 
interest-based behavior--and which do not necessarily follow from historical path 
dependencies.  Rather, these ideas and actions may resonate with either forgotten long 
standing values, like those of reflexive labor law and the governance of social law--or 
with newly emerging values. 
  
The ―argumentative turn‖ is influenced by the post structural focus on the practices in 
which humans engage--not the humans themselves, nor the structures by which they are 
constrained.  Such focus centers on the way arguments are made--within a discursive 
ensemble--and can be read as a ―text.‖  How does a group of people creatively bring a 
―self-referential‖ model of practices into existence, how they think about, how they talk 
about it, how they transubstantiate it, maintain and reform it.  
  
The argumentative turn follows the discursive turn in developing the study of institutional 
normativism beyond a sociology of practical knowledge of iterated games described by 
Giandomenico Majone (1989). 
  
Geoffrey Hawthorn (1976:18) noted that Karl Mannheim‘s sociology of knowledge 
―never approach[ed] a resolution to the very difficult question of the relation between 
―the internal and external interpretations of ideas.‖  CI extends the critical theory of 
Habermas to a focus on the internal relations of argument, and beyond the external 
relationism of applied practical knowledge that characterizes II.  Whereas HI’s focus is 
causality and capacity, II’s focus is how ideas are constituted (constructed) and framed.  
CI’s internalism transcends historicism and sociology with a focus on principles and the 
immanence of their argument.  HI and II operate on the level of institutional facticity, 
whereas CI operates on the level of principles, value-form categorials that historicism 
and sociology bracket out. 
  
  
NETWORK LOGIC AND INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEMENTARITY 
  
The autonomies of relational contracting and private law regimes reflect the pluralism of 
instituted associations and instituting associations that constitute the pluralism of post-
liberal contract law and labor law.  Twentieth century contract law and labor law sought 
to institutionalize the social regulation of enduring class conflict, group conflict and 
corporate conflict.  Autonomous regimes of law can be understood in terms of what 
Gunther Teubner calls the ―polycontextuarality‖ of non-state regimes  (including social 
partnerships of labor and capital, as well as international NGOs) legislating, regulating 
and adjudicating within their own subsystems; as well as in relating to each other.  Such 
as approach studies the contextual space between such regimes as a space for the 
collision of discourses, language games, texts and projects. 
  
Gunther Teubner (2002, 2003, 2004) looks to a multiplicity of subsystemic 
subconstitutions where internal governance is constitutionally constrained to take notice 
of its diverse social systemic context.    Teubner uses the concept of polycontexturality to 
account for:(1) how the plurality of self-constituting institutional contexts of conflict 
regulation logics function as heterarchies rather than as hierarchies of discourse-specific 
norms ; (2) how  plural communities  are contextuated institutionally to regulate 
themselves and recognize the logics and discourses of other external communities; and 
(3) how  the plural logics and modes of discourse  come to collide when not organized on 
the pattern of neural networks. The term ―polycontexturality‖ is used by Teubner‘s 
teacher  Niklas Luhmann (1982) in The Differentiation of Society to describe the plurality 
of logical domains., sites of decentered discourse and decentralized law, and a cascading 
complexity of differentiated subsystems. (Cf.Zolo:7.)  
  
Luhmann was following Gerhard Gunther and Warren McColluch  before him in 
referring to the plurality of logical domains as contextures. Within institutional 
contextures specific codes emerge to help provide transjunctional operations of plurality, 
rather than operations of simple binaries. These are codes for interdiscursivity and mutual 
learning, Charles Sabel (1995a-c) sees such polycontextural networking as institutional 
design as transforming transactions into discussions by which parties come to reinterpret 
themselves and their relation discursively and argumentatively through continual joint 
deliberations. Governance is understood as increasingly being of necessity heterarchical, 
and not according to hierarchical principal—agent accountability and sovereignty (Sabel 
and Simon, 2006).Through the continual deliberation required by such complexity, 
common understandings are articulated as reciprocally defining. Networks of relational 
contracting sustained by the value of future relationships take into account an 
autonomous interactive normative order wherein mutually accepted interpretation 
emerges.   
  
(See Oliver Williamson, The Economics of Capitalism:  Firms, Markets, Relational 
Contracting (New York:  The Free Press, 1985) which builds on the work of Ian Macneil, 
―Contracts:  Adjustment of Long Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical 
and Relational Contract Law,‖ Northwestern University Law Review  72 (1978): 854-
905.  Williamson recognizes that between the neoclassical and relational contracting 
schemes, there is a shift of emphasis from the original agreements in the former to the 
entire relation as it evolves through time in the latter.  The relational nature of the 
―contracting‖ becomes more binding than the legal guarantee and enforcement 
mechanisms.  Relational contracts are the informal and unwritten agreements within and 
between firms.  These agreements as to vertical and horizontal integration are sustained 
by the value of future relationships and can be described in repeated game models.  They 
circumvent difficulties in the formal individuals-based prerogative contract.  Thus 
networks of relational contracting take into account an interactive normative order where 
in mutually accepted interpretation emerges.) 
  
Each network has its own autonomous path dependent institutional trajectories.  Each has 
unfolding normative bonds tied to elocutionary forces inherent in communicative reason 
(Bohman, 1995: 241; and Alexy, 1989, 1993). Habermasian themes of discourse-specific 
norms and procedures,  
as well as principles for critically evaluating discourse are not enough. They must be 
linked to institutions, institutionalized practices, and institutional guarantees. 
  
Institutional complementarity  is the term that game theorists and economists like Jenna 
Bednar (2005) and Bruno Amable (2003, 2005a, 2005b) refer to the way specified 
institutional patterns effect institutional influences on specified other institutions. Manuel 
Castells (1995) and Bruno  Latour (2005) along with Teubner see the emerging network 
society  as requiring a ―structural coupling‖ of autonomous subsystem regimes of 
contracting and standard-setting. Complementarity is understood here as the manner in 
which components of a whole compensate for each other‘s deficiencies, contradictions 
and colliding discourses in constituting the whole. Institutions are complementary to each 
other in their pluralism, rather than ―interlocking.‖ Robert Boyer (cf. Amable 2005b: 
368) uses the concept of hybridization  -- so central in Castells, Latour and Teubner -- to 
describe the process by which colliding subsystem regime logics transform each other 
heterarchically. These networks resist tendencies toward centralization; and range from 
loosely organized decentralized nets with multiple serial nodes; to those handling 
franchise contracts, legal obligation and liability patterns; to nets with fully collectivized 
liability. Most are of mixed or hybrid character, spawning a bewildering range of 
incompatible discourses, norms and laws.  
  
Chris Ansell (2006) uses the term network institutionalism (NI) to stress the need to 
comprehend policy-making behavior contextually, especially where institutional 
complementarity, interweaving, interdiscursivity and interconnectivity generate strong 
norms of mutual obligation and reciprocity. Ansell (76-77) notes how Granovetter (1985) 
stressed a social network approach to avoid  
  
         either a  completely norm-determined (overly-sociologized) perspective 
or an interest group determined (under-sociologized) perspective; 
         either a market or a hierarchical approach.  
  
Network institutionalism (NI) is a variant of constructivism. Agents do not exist 
independently from their social environment and its collectively shared 
frameworks (systems) of meaning. Material interests are context-dependent. 
Agency is not autonomous, but contextually situated. Ideas and institutions 
interact; institutions are predicated on ideas. The nature of our material interest is 
socially contextuated, indeed polycontexturated. The ideas and institutions do not 
merely reflect material conditions; they constitute material practices in which 
ideas and institutional facts interact. Through these ongoing material practices the 
ideas and institutional facts reproduce themselves endogenously and unfold 
normatively endogenously. As Pierre Bourdieu demonstrated, ideas and 
institutions reproduce themselves not as disembodied templates, beliefs, 
traditions, ideologies and mental models, but as material practices. While 
practices display conventions; conventions do not constitute practices.   
  
Following Frank Nullmeier (2006), we can distinguish two types of non-hierarchical 
networks: bargaining regimes and argumentation networks.  The former allows 
for heterarchy, but participation can be limited to a few exclusive participating 
actors whose preferred knowledge form is the generated managerial expertise as 
discourse. The extent of recognition of participants and their discourse is the 
 main characteristic, as is an emphasis on allocation privileges rather than on 
participatory rights. 
  
Bargaining regime is the term used by David Kettler for this social partnership within 
and beyond the parameters of labor law. Negotiated democracy is the term used 
by Gerhard Lehmbruch to cover the continuum from advisory councils and 
pluralism to concertation and corporatism.  Bargaining regimes justify demands 
within a discourse of generally accepted / credible  norms, consensus bound 
norms rather than consensus projecting ones.  
Argumentation networks encourage participant negotiating actors to persuade each other 
of the validity and justifiability of their warranted assertions. They do so within 
generalizable norms, rather than generally accepted conventions. They do so 
knowing they can pursue their claim‘s immanent justifiability.   
  
Network institutionalism is a stepped-up constructivism that enables us to heed the 
argumentative turn in policy analysis with a focus on discursive committedness 
itself, rather than merely the application of the commitment of others. This is an 
interpretivist focus on how we first create normic statements and practices; and 
then reflexively critique the institutionalizing practical reason behind them. 
  
Argumentation denotes the verbal and social activity of reason that aim at increasing (or 
decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint in multi-agent 
interchange - - interchange between interlocutors.  This is done by putting 
forward a constellation of propositions intended to justify, validate or refute the 
standpoint before some community of rational adjudicators - - scientists, experts, 
judges, planning commissions, arbitrators, citizens.  The interchange of arguments 
involve constituting locations, illocutions, perlocutions as well as the overarching 
protocols that interlocutors and negotiators agree should govern such 
interchange.   
 Argumentation occurs in a field of practical rationality:  that is, a ―world for us‖ in its 
being the constituted  neomatic bearer of meaning, a socio-cultural lifeworld. This 
is a world we can question and reinterpret in reconstituting (neotic) projects that 
get us beyond compliance.  At the core here is the problem ofconstituting 
knowledge (Konstitutionsfrage) traces back to the critical philosophy of Kant in 
its focus on the conditions of the constitution of both empirical reality and reality-
related thinking/interpreting.  
The Kantian expedient is to locate values beyond experience in a noumenal realm.   
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School follows Hegel‘s phenomenological 
radicalization of  Kant‘s critical philosophy, but not in bringing truth to an 
immediate existence as a real moment of the idea. Instead, this Critical Theory of 
Society aims at bringing empirical existence to truth. The immanence of truth in 
practical reason remains the touchstone for Critical Theory, as it holds the 
constitutive self-formation process as reconstructable.  Particular, the 
interpretative tradition developed by  
Habermas, focuses on the contingency of institutionally bound legitimation claims, and 
the consensus-projecting validity claims that challenge contingent institutional 
frames.  Discursively, what are to be studied are the warranted assertions in the 
material practice that amount to the speaking of a language (langage), not just the 
structure or grammar of language code. (langue). 
 
 
Arguments have their own ontology regarding premises, commitments, warrants, claims, 
norms, value, truth.  And argumentative networks are constituted by the 
interchange of arguments involving locutions, illocutions, perlocutions and the 
voluntarily created protocols by which we govern the interchange of arguments.  
The internal relations of argument networks include inference 
schemes/applications; preference schemes/applications; strategic ―attack‖ 
schemes/applications, rebuttal schemes/applications; and evaluation 
schemes/applications.  
  
Beyond the application of sedimented discursive strategies that come to be taken for 
granted (e.g., Hay, Schmidt),we need a focus on representing the interpretations 
by which new discourse and institutions are constructed endogenously within a 
field of practical reason (e.g., Ansell, Bevir) - - one that leads to a critical 
evaluation of the truthfulness and justice of such newly constructed discourse and 
institutional practice. 
  
Ansell‘s network-oriented approach to ideas and institutions recognize the necessity for 
argumentative strategies to work their way out both inter-organizationally and at 
multiple levels of governance.  Ansell‘s network institutionalism (NI) further 
recognizes the complementarity in heterarchy, rather than the pyramid quality of 
hierarchy.  NI also understands that like markets, networks operate without 
central direction and according to rules of exchange.  Nonetheless, unlike 
markets, network interactions are more diffuse than discrete, and more social than 
impersonal.  In contrast to markets, normative commitments and committedness 
are important (Ansell, 1997-2000).Complementary and even overlapping 
linguistic codes and symbolic discourse are understood to be constructed around 
ideas, not around an ethos, an essence, or a sense of ―folk.‖ 
 NI ultimately comprehends what Ansell calls ―collaborative governance‖ or what we 
have referred to as complementary consensus 
projection:                                                                                                                  
1.  identifying the un-necessary unanticipated consequences of present day 
institutional bound material practices; and 
2. recognizing the interconnections of mutual benefit that mitigate the legal costs 
of adversarial institutional relationships. 
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